Dr Bob Lockie
I am a Chartered Psychologist with an academic background in both psychology and philosophy – with a broad and deep background in both disciplines. I have thirty years university teaching experience, with particular expertise in the history and philosophy of psychology; but with extensive experience in other areas in the discipline – notably individual differences – and in certain areas of cognitive psychology. In my research I work on the borders between theoretical psychology and the philosophy of psychology. My research interests are wide-ranging; but in particular concern epistemology, free will/responsibility, philosophy of mind/psychology, and metaphilosophy. My major work, the product of 20 years of research, is Lockie, R. (2018). Free Will and Epistemology: A Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom; London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic.
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Qualifications
BSc Psychology (Hatfield Polytechnic), MA Philosophy (Sussex University), MPhil Philosophy (Rutgers University), DPhil Philosophy (Sussex University)
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Memberships
CPsycholFHEA
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Research and publications
Books
Bob Lockie is the author of Lockie, R. (2018) paperback (2019). Free Will and Epistemology: A Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom; London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic. Single-author monograph, ISBN’s 9781350123137; 978-1-3500-2904-0; 978-1-3500-2906-4; 978-1-3500-2905-7
Journal articles
Lockie, R. (2018). Review of Jiri Benovsky, “Eliminativism, Objects, and Persons: The Virtues of Non-Existence”. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
Lockie, R. (2018). Virtue Epistemology and the Sources of Epistemic Value. In H. Battaly (ed) The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology, Abingdon: Routledge.
Lockie, R. (2016). Response to Elqayam, Nottelmann, Peels and Vahid on My Paper 'Perspectivism, Deontologism and Epistemic Poverty'. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 5(3), 21-47.
Lockie, R. (2015) Perspectivism, deontologism and epistemic poverty. Social Epistemology; online first June 2015 DOI 10.1080/02691728.2014.990281
Lockie, R. (2014). Is Philosophy Useless? The Philosophers’ Magazine, 71(4), 24-28. doi: 10.5840/tpm20157197.
Lockie, R. (2014) The Epistemology of neo-Gettier epistemology. South African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 33, Issue 2, April, 247-258.
Lockie, R. (2014) The Regulative and the Theoretical in epistemology. Abstracta 8(1) pp. 3–14, 2014.
Lockie, R. (2014) Three recent Frankfurt cases. Philosophia, Volume 42, Issue 4, pp 1005-1032.
Lockie, B. (2008) Problems for Virtue Theories in Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 138(2); March: 169-191.
Lockie, B. (2006) Response to Anders Tolland’s Iterated Non-Refutation: Robert Lockie on Relativism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14(2): 245-254.
Lockie, B. (2004) Knowledge, Provenance and Psychological Explanation. Philosophy 79: 421-433.
Lockie, B. (2004) Transcendental Arguments against Eliminativism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54(4): 569-589.
Lockie, B. (2003) Depth Psychology and Self-Deception. Philosophical Psychology 16(1): 127-148.
Lockie, B. (2003) Review of Mele, A: Self-Deception Unmasked. Philosophy 78: 296-300.Lockie, B. (2003) Relativism and Reflexivity. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11(3): 319-339.
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Conferences
Recent Conference Presentations (selection)
Introduction to the Conference, Free Will and Epistemology; Mind Association/Aristotelian Society one-day conference on Robert Lockie’s monograph of the same name, at the Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Studies, Senate House, University of London, May 2019.
The Epistemic Transcendental Argument Against Determinism; Workshop on Robert Lockie’s book Free Will and Epistemology: a Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom. Organised by the Central EuropeanUniversity, the Institute of Philosophy of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and the Lund-Gothenburg Responsibility Project, Budapest, October 2018.
The Transcendental Argument for Agential Libertarianism; Assessing Agent Causal Libertarianism in the Free Will Debate; Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences, October 2018.
The Indirect Transcendental Argument for Freedom; World Congress of Philosophy, Beijing, August 2018.
Self-determination and Determination by Reasons; Lund-Gothenburg Responsibility Project Libertarian Agency and Metaphysics – Themes from Clarke, Lund University, June 2018.
Free Will and Moral Responsibility; Conway Hall Ethical society, Feb 2018 (outreach).
Mixed Virtue Epistemology and the Problem of Fundamental Axiological Disunity; Joint Session of the Mind Association & Aristotelian Society, Warwick, July 2015.
The Epistemology of neo-Gettier Epistemology; Philosophical Society of Southern Africa, Bloemfontein, SA, January 2014.
The Methodological and Metaphilosophical Assumptions of the Gettier Tradition in Epistemology; UCD Philosophies of Philosophy Conference, Dublin, June 2013.
Meta-Epistemic Desiderata: Two Arguments for a Stark Distinction; Joint Session of the Mind Association & Aristotelian Society, Stirling, July 2012.
The Epistemic Transcendental Argument against Determinism; 38th Conference on Value Inquiry: Free Will, Responsibility and Science, Salem State University, Salem, Mass, April 2012.
Prospects for a Transcendental Argument against Determinism; Seventh European Congress of Analytic Philosophy, (ECAP7), Milan, September 2011.
The Indirect Transcendental Argument against Determinism; Joint Session of the Mind Association & Aristotelian Society, Sussex, July 2011.
What Should We Require of an Account in Normative Epistemology? Spanish Society for Analytic Philosophy (SEFA), Universidad de La Laguna, Tenerife, October 2010.
The Regulative and the Theoretical in Ethics and Epistemology; Episteme Research Group: Justification Revisited Conference, Department of Philosophy, Université de Genève, March 2010.
